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Abstract 
The paper defines generic requirements towards cooperative planning in the nucleus of any supply network that is constituted by a 
pair of autonomous manufacturer and supplier who possess asymmetric information on demand forecast and costs, respectively. 
Then a novel way is suggested for investigating this problem by means of the apparatus of mechanism design. The analysis results 
in some provable generic properties as for efficiency and truthfulness, and shows the impossibility of fair cost and profit sharing.  
Further on, design principles towards a payment scheme are devised that provide incentive for the partners to cooperate in order to 
minimize costs. This payment can be considered the price for a flexible supply service. As examples, the generic framework is 
instantiated with two particular cooperative supply mechanisms.  
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1. Introduction 
The paper exposes the problem of cooperative 
planning in supply chains where partners have 
asymmetric knowledge of demand and supply related 
information, and decide autonomously, by considering 
their own, eventually conflicting objectives. The supply 
chain is supposed to operate in an environment that 
generates uncertain demand. The key questions are how 
to achieve acceptable emergent behavior of the partners 
with guaranteed properties that relate to the global 
performance of the overall system, like service level, 
total cost, stability, or energy and/or eco-efficiency. 
Such or similar questions are in the core of sustainable 
manufacturing that can be attained only if individual, 
profit maximizing partners are willing to cooperate [12]. 
The paper suggests a novel methodology for modeling 
and analyzing this problem, as well as devises generic 
design principles for cooperative supply planning. 
In particular, we investigate the problem of 
coordinating the medium-term planning level decisions 
of autonomous partners in a two-echelon supply chain 
where the manufacturer of end-products is in the role of 
the buyer who needs component delivery from the 
supplier. The manufacturer, being closer to the market of 
end-products, prepares forecast for market demand, 
plans its production and generates the dependent demand 
for components. This forecast is its own, local 
information. On the other hand, the supplier has its 
private information about production costs that are 
essential for making appropriate decisions about the 
production of components. Supply can be considered a 
service that is burdened by (1) uncertainty of the market 
demand, as well as (2) the strategic manipulation of 
information possessed by the partners. E.g., given the 
risk of component shortage, the manufacturer may tend 
to forward inflated forecasts to the supplier. 
Alternatively, if planners at the manufacturer  side are 
rewarded for over-performing their plans, then they 
deliberately underestimate the demand and share too 
pessimistic forecasts with the suppliers [4]. The supplier, 
however, will try to outwit its partner and tinker with the 
forecast. All this typically leads to corrupted service, 
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frequent contingency planning, obsolete inventories and 
additional costs.  
The supply chain management (SCM) literature is 
typically rich in process design, while widely neglects 
the necessary governance structure [3][8]. It is also well-
known that there are serious differences between theory 
and practice of SCM, mainly due to the absence of 
strategic elements in the collaboration [10][12]. In this 
paper we try to bridge this gap by elaborating the key 
requirements of cooperative planning and handling its 
strategic implications by taking the approach of 
mechanism design (MD). 
Mechanism design, also considered inverse game 
theory, has a specific engineering perspective. It applies 
the model of non-cooperative games with agents having 
incomplete information, and investigates how the private 
information influencing the other agents ilities can be 
elicited [2][9]. Accordingly, MD can resolve dilemmas 
and suboptimal performance in strategic situations by 
aligning the objectives of the partners. Since this theory 
considers strategic interactions of self-interested agents 
with asymmetric (private) information, it offers 
promising applicability also in supply chain research 
[1][12]. In the sequel we design a cooperative supply 
protocol that controls the flow of material, information 
and financial assets. The model helps answering 
questions whether and how partners are interested in 
telling unbiased information, can make decisions that are 
globally efficient, or share their costs in a fair way. 
2. Problem statement 
The generic requirements towards a mechanism that 
facilitates cooperative planning specify, on the one hand, 
the frame of a theoretical model. On the other hand, 
however, they concur with the conditions and 
expectations of managerial practice. Summing up, we 
seek mechanisms that meet the following criteria: 
 Autonomy: Local information, utilities and decision 
rights of the partners have to be respected. Since each 
partner has to exercise control over future events in 
its own premises, planning problems must be solved 
locally. 
 Strict asymmetry: Any knowledge or belief about the 
planning process is excluded. 
 No third party: The mechanism should not involve 
any new party in the decisions making (e.g., broker, 
facilitator, etc.). Every decision should be made by 
the partners who form the chain. Note that this  
together with autonomy  implies a decentralized 
implementation. 
 Strong solution concept: The mechanism has to 
guarantee that the decisions of the partners are 
dominant, i.e., could not decide better given the 
decision of the other party. 
 Efficiency: The mechanism should achieve the 
optimal network-wide solution which is, in our case, 
the minimal expected total cost. 
 Participation: In order to assure participation of the 
partners, the mechanism should guarantee non-
negative profit for each partner.  
There are further requirements towards planning and 
execution that are essential in real-world applications: 
 Uncertainty: Any cooperative planning method 
should be able to handle uncertain demand forecast 
and even confidence in demand forecast.  
 Responsiveness: Planning has to be provided 
feedback from realization, and the mechanism should 
have an element for correcting eventual fallacy of 
planning (like rolling horizon planning, or, in case of 
inventory glitches, a new production cycle, 
backordering, compensation for lost sales or obsolete 
stocks etc.) [12]. Feedback from realization is, 
however, common knowledge of the parties. 
 Tractability: The forecasting and planning algorithms 
should be computationally tractable. 
As a solution, we seek a decision making and 
communication protocol that locates each necessary 
decision to be made and arranges the flow of 
information, material and financial assets between the 
market and the supply chain, as well as between the 
parties who constitute the chain. 
3. The mechanism design approach 
3.1. The basic model  
This section presents a basic model of the cooperative 
supply service with the application of the concepts of 
mechanism design. The model is a variant presented in 
[6]. For the sake of the theoretical analysis we 
temporarily disregard some of the initial requirements 
and insert a mechanism in between the manufacturer and 
the supplier. This central authority will receive 
information from both parties, make the planning 
decision and arrange the flow of payments between the 
parties according to the following protocol (see Fig. 1): 
1. Forecasting demand (manufacturer). 
2. Sharing private information, i.e., forecasts 
(manufacture) and costs (supplier) with the 
mechanism. 
3. Planning and ordering (mechanism). 
4. Producing (supplier). 
5. Consuming according to realized demand 
(manufacturer). 
6. Paying (all, including the market). 
308   J. Váncza and P. Egri /  Procedia CIRP  12 ( 2013 )  306 – 311 
supplier
market
mechanism
2 2
3
4
manufacturer
5
5 6
6 6
3
5
1
 
Fig. 1. The classical mechanism design protocol 
The crux of the problem is that we have to prevent the 
strategic manipulation of information the partners 
possess privately, i.e., the forecast and cost. As it was 
shown earlier, in a typical business scenario both parties 
may have a number of incentives to distort this 
information. However, without the truthful disclosure of 
such information optimal planning is not possible. So as 
to prevent manipulation, taxes will be introduced that 
affect the individual utilities of the partners. Taxes are 
realized as transfer payments between the parties and the 
central mechanism [2]. Further analysis hence requires a 
distinction of real and communicated information, as 
well as the clarification of payments and utilities.  
3.2. The formal model 
Elements of the formal that are needed to capture the 
basic mechanism supposing a central authority are 
shown in Fig. 2. The symbols and their definitions are 
also summarized in Table 1 below. 
f, mu , sc u
c
mt st
( , )f c
v
manufacturer supplier
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Fig. 2. The formal model of the coordination mechanism 
As for the information available for the partners, we 
take the following assumptions: 
 Each partner has some private information: the 
manufacturer knows the  demand forecasts, while 
the supplier knows the production cost structure, 
denoted by c. However, no a priori belief about the 
 maintained. For instance, no 
assumption is made on the form of forecasts.  
 The disclosure of private information is not 
necessarily truthful. Hence, the manufacturer may 
communicate instead of , and the supplier c , 
instead of its known cost c. 
 Realization of demand  in the market is, however, 
commonly known by each partner, including the 
central mechanism.  
As for decision making and its consequences, the 
following basic assumptions are taken: 
 Decisions are aimed at completely fulfilling uncertain 
demand. 
 Planning decision is made by the central authority 
using a choice (or planning) function f that calculates 
an optimal production plan x in response to a given 
demand forecast and cost parameter.  
 If demand is overestimated, obsolete inventory stacks 
ups. If demand is underestimated, new production 
setup is required and backlogs are generated. In any 
case, extra costs are incurred. 
 Real costs denoted by c( ) are the consequences of 
planning decisions and realized demand. The total of 
production and inventory costs are accumulated on 
the side of the supplier who provides the service.  
 Both partners are rational and maximize their own 
utility. Utility of the manufacturer (um) can be 
expressed as the difference of its income from the 
market (v) and its payment (tm) to the central 
mechanism. In turn, utility of the supplier (us) is the 
payment received from the central mechanism (ts) 
minus its incurred real production costs (c). 
Table 1. Basic notions and symbols of the formal model 
Demand and production related information 
real and communicated demand forecast ,  
real and communicated production cost ,c c  
choice (planning) function ( , )f c  
production plan determined by the choice function X 
realized demand at manufacturer  
realized cost at the supplier  
Payments and utilities 
payment function of manufacturer ( , , )mt c  
payment function of supplier ( , , )st c  
income of manufacturer ( )v  
utility of manufacturer ( ) ( , , )m mu v t c  
utility of supplier ( , , ) ( ( , ), )s su t c c f c  
3.3. Fundamental properties of the mechanism 
When the performance of the overall system is an 
outcome that emerges from the interaction of local 
decisions, it is essential to state some analytic, provable 
sequel 
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we define the basic properties of the generic supply 
coordination mechanism. From the definitions some 
theorems can be derived. (The proofs are omitted for 
lack of space, for details see [6][7]). 
Note that the mechanism is determined by its choice 
function and the payments it arranges. Strategy-
proofness reflects the issue whether and how 
truthfulness pays off. A mechanism M=(f,tm,ts) is 
strategy-proof, if truth telling is a dominant strategy for 
every partner, i.e., it maximizes their expected individual 
utility. (M is strongly strategy-proof if telling the truth is 
the only strategy that maximizes expected utility.) 
Formally, strategy-proofness can be expressed for the 
case of the manufacturer and supplier as follows: 
, : ( , , ) ( , , )m mc u c u cE E  (1) 
, , : ( , , , ) ( , , , )s sc c u c c u c cE E  (2) 
Efficiency relates to the consequences of decisions 
and the performance of the overall system as seen from 
an external point of view. In ou
decisions on production quantities are made solely by 
the f( ,c) choice (or planning) function. Hence, the 
mechanism is efficient, if f maximizes social welfare, 
i.e., the sum of the expected utilities of the partners 
without the internal payments. This is just the total 
income of the system from the market minus the actual 
production costs. Formally,  
, : ( , ) argmax ,
argmin ,
x
x
c f c v c x
c x
E
E
 
(3) 
Shortly, the mechanism is efficient if it minimizes the 
expected total cost in face of meeting uncertain demand. 
If a mechanism is both strategy-proof and efficient, 
then its optimal overall performance is guaranteed. 
However, this nice property comes hand in hand with 
another one:  the . 
We have proven that if M=(f,tm,ts) is a strategy-proof and 
efficient mechanism, then the payment to the supplier 
does not depend on its cost [6]. Formally, 
, , ,: ( , , ) ( , , )s sc c t c t cE E  (4) 
( , , ) reduces to ( , ).s st c t  (5) 
Hence, the supplier may claim whatever cost, but the 
payment ts received for its contribution will depend on 
the communicated and realized demand quantities only. 
No one cares how this demand was satisfied on the side 
of the supplier. This implies that the supplier can 
maximize its utility solely by minimizing its costs. 
Finally, the last fundamental property is budget 
balance. The mechanism M=(f,tm,ts) is budget balanced 
if there is neither surplus nor deficit in the payments. 
Hence, no payments or debts are accumulated in the 
mechanism. Formally expressed,  
, : ( , ) ( , )s mt t  (6) 
Note that budget balance is a necessary requirement 
of removing the third party from the classical centralized 
design shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 and setting up a 
decentralized supply chain coordination scheme that fits 
our original requirements. 
3.4. Designing a decentralized coordination mechanism 
The above conceptual framework helps capturing the 
key elements and general characteristics of the 
coordination mechanism that should comply with the 
requirements listed in Section 2. Clearly, we need a 
strategy-proof and efficient mechanism that warrants 
also budget balance.  
One of the essential general results of MD is that 
given any efficient choice function f, it is possible to 
construct a payment scheme that guarantees strategy-
proofness. In such so-called Grooves mechanisms the 
payment received by each partner from the mechanism 
has the form ti(.)=gi(.)+hi(.), where gi(.) is the total 
social welfare of all partners except i in case of an 
optimal choice,  while hi(.) is an arbitrary function 
whose outcome does not depend on the information 
communicated by i. The intuition behind this scheme is 
that nobody is interested in strategically manipulating 
the communicated information, while, at the same time, 
income. Anyone who acts according to this incentive 
and assumes that all the other rational partners behave in 
a similar way, can reasonable expect that its own utility 
will also be maximized in case of an optimal decision. 
Hence, the payment scheme provides an incentive for 
telling the truth, and, after all, for cooperation. As for 
budget balance, it is a well-known result that the 
Grooves mechanism excludes this property; i.e., in the 
general case there is no mechanism that is efficient, 
strategy-proof and budget-balanced at the same time 
[11].  
After removing the central agency we get a 
decentralized supply chain coordination model, where 
both the protocol and the forms of information and 
financial flows are well-specified (see Fig. 3). Planning 
is performed by the supplier, hence there is no need to 
communicate costs. Both the ma
forecast and payment are directed immediately to the 
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supplier. However, even though it has no active role any 
more, the mechanism is still there in the shadow and 
specifies the payment if we are going to warrant useful 
properties like efficiency and strategy-proofness. 
, mu , , sc f u
m st t
v
manufacturer supplier
market
 
Fig. 3. The decentralized supply chain coordination model 
The only open question is that of the payment.  
Payment formula of the Grooves mechanism cannot be 
applied because of eq. (6). Though, a specific feature of 
the problem is that the communicated forecast can be 
verified at the time when demand  is realized. A 
strategy-proof payment can be constructed in following 
form:  
( , ) ( , ) ( )mt g h  (7) 
where h is an arbitrary function while g warrants that 
whenever an event  is drawn from a distribution , then   
( , ) ( , ) .g gE E  (8) 
This means that truthful forecast sharing is a rational 
decision of the manufacturer. 
 
4. Supply chain coordination mechanisms 
So as to get a supply mechanism applicable in a practical 
setting, the above framework has to be filled in with 
detailed specification of how to (1) make forecasts, (2) 
do planning, and (3) arrange payments. In the sequel we 
present two kinds of such expansions. 
4.1. Single-period supply with expected forecast  
In the simplest case, assume a single period model 
where the manufacturer generates forecast as expected 
value of the market demand. (Note that most supply 
planning systems cannot handle stochastic problems.) In 
case of shortage corrective planning scheme is applied 
(emergency production, backordering, etc.) In this case it 
is easy to see that the payment function in the form 
( , ) ( )mt  (9) 
where  > 0 is a constant, and  is an arbitrary function, 
provides a mechanism that is strongly strategy-proof. 
The second term covers payment for the delivered 
products, while the first term defines the price of flexibly 
supply service. The closer the forecast is to realized 
demand, the cheaper is the service. Hence, the 
manufacturer has an incentive to generate as good a 
forecast as possible. 
4.2. Newsvendor supply with emergency production 
Now we expand the above model by assuming that 
forecast is given by the expected value and standard 
deviation of the demand (m and , respectively). 
However, no specific demand distribution is assumed. In 
this case, the manufacturer communicates the pair ( , )m  
to the supplier. The supplier plans and produces 
accordingly, but if actual demand exceeds produced 
quantities, makes an emergency setup so as to cover the 
shortage. This emergency production incurs, of course, 
extra costs. Note that this model is an extended version 
of the so-called newsvendor model where optimal lot 
sizes can be calculated (for details, see [7]). Once having 
a choice function that is able to generate an optimal plan 
on the side of the supplier, the crux of the remaining 
problem is to construct a strategy-proof payment 
function for the manufacturer. While upon execution the 
difference of expected and realized demand can easily be 
measured, the accuracy of the standard deviation can 
hardly be assessed based on a single observation. 
Though, there is a way out of this dilemma, if we fill in 
the generic payment formula in eq. (7) appropriately. 
Specifically, we have proven that the payment function 
in the form  
2( )( , , ) ( )m
mt m  (10) 
where  > 0 is a constant, and  is an arbitrary function, 
is strongly strategy-proof [7]. That means that the 
manufacturer can maximize its utility if its 
communicated m  and  values are as close to the ideal 
distribution of demand as possible. The interpretation of 
this composite payment is as follows: (1) the last term is 
the price of the delivered products. The first term is 
again the price for flexible service that has now a factor 
(2) that is proportional with the imprecision of forecast, 
and (3) a second factor that is proportional with the 
uncertainty of communicated demand forecast. 
Summing up, the payment expresses the cost of flexible 
supply service that meets all the requirements presented 
in Section 2. 
4.3. Computational example of the newsvendor supply 
Even though the above mechanism has some 
guaranteed properties, one has to make extensive 
computational test so as to set parameters of the payment 
function appropriately and to investigate the possibilities 
of a reasonable cost or profit sharing. Now we 
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demonstrate on a single example how the payment in eq. 
(10) compensates the supplier for the increased 
uncertainty of the demand. We assume a linear payment 
for the products, i.e., ( )=  where p is a fixed unit 
price.  With the parameter values p = 10, =2, m=1000, 
Fig. 4 shows how the payment increases when the 
standard deviation  varies in the range [1,400] 
assuming normal distribution of the demand. Average 
payments have been calculated on 1000 random demand 
data for each . 
100 200 300 400
10000
10500
11000
11500
t
 
Fig. 4 Payment to the supplier with increased forecast uncertainty 
As Fig. 4 shows, the payment for the products 
oscillates around the expected value of demand (pm = 
10000), while the payment for the supply service 
increases with the standard deviation, which means that 
the supplier gets higher compensation on a riskier 
market. The gradient of the curve, i.e., the ration of risk 
sharing, can be controlled with the parameter .  
The participation of partners can be warranted if the 
service is profitable for both of them. However, they 
have to come to an agreement on the choice of the 
parameter  and the function  before the service. And 
this is the point where theory ends (remind the 
impossibility of fair cost sharing) and a new avenue is to 
be opened for the systematic simulation and negotiation 
over factors of the payment.  
5. Conclusions 
In the paper we defined the generic requirements 
towards cooperative planning in the nucleus of any 
supply network that is constituted by a pair of 
autonomous manufacturer and supplier. Supply was 
considered a service in face of uncertain demand 
forecasted by the manufacturer. We suggested a novel 
way for handling this problem by means of the 
conceptual and methodological apparatus of mechanism 
design. This approach led to generic design principles 
towards a coordination protocol (including payment 
schemes) that warrants truthfulness and global 
efficiency. The analysis resulted also in some negative 
results: even though the requirements as for cooperative 
planning are one by one reasonable, unfortunately, their 
set as a whole implies contradiction. Hence, some of the 
claims have to be relaxed. The design principles of the 
mechanism cast an empty framework that have to be 
filled in with particular choice functions and payments 
that fit the conditions of an actual supply planning 
problem. In a nutshell, such details of two particular 
mechanisms were also presented. We can but note here 
that the cooperative planning mechanism we developed 
earlier for a multi-period, stochastic and rolling horizon 
supply planning problem can also be re-casted in the 
generic framework presented here [4]. Beyond ensuring 
participation  which is an open problem  the 
requirement of tractability raises also a severe issue 
when it comes to planning [1][9]. The algorithmic 
problem should be solved on a case by case, depending 
on the actual planning model applied. Finally, the 
methodology can be applied in settings that involve 
multiple partners [6], or flexible supply service including 
lost sales.  
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